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Abstract 
 
The Celtic Tiger boom, and now its collapse, has been largely analysed through the 
lens of neo-classical economics and modernisation theory with much attention being 
paid to economic issues such as the role of foreign direct investment (FDI) and the 
need for cost competitiveness, or social issues such as the liberalisation of values and 
practices, upward social mobility, increased living standards and debates about social 
polarisation. While these lens offer many valuable and valid insights, they tend to 
neglect the particular and distinctive structural characteristics of the way the Irish 
economy and Irish society have developed, and the reasons for these. This paper takes 
a more structuralist approach, identifying the ‘Irish model’ that emerged during the 
boom years, a particular form of structured power. The paper places this ‘model’ in 
the wider context of the emergence of financialisation as a driver of a particular kind 
of global economy. Focusing attention on the role of the financial sector in structuring 
and driving this so-called ‘new economy’, allows the Irish boom to be more clearly 
and accurately identified as one example of national development that was profoundly 
shaped by the flows, the power and the values of financialisation, though with a 
particular Irish hue reflecting long-standing features of Irish society such as the role 
of property speculation and so-called ‘developers’. The paper then interrogates the 
legacies of the boom derived from the multiple restructurings that have transformed 
Ireland. In the light of these legacies, the paper concludes by offering a reading of 
possible future scenarios as they can now be identified amid the debates and politics 
of the post-boom crisis. 
 
 
By late 2008 there was recognition by Irish policy makers and the general public that 
the boom years of the Celtic Tiger were well and truly over and that the country was 
facing what is widely regarded as its most severe economic and social crisis since 
independence in 1922. The role of this paper is to discuss the legacies of the boom, 
analysing its key features, placing it in the wider context of the global financial crisis, 
and mapping out likely future scenarios. Drawing on our different disciplinary 
backgrounds, but with a common grounding in international development theory, we 
intend in this way to draw out some of the key lessons to be learnt from the Celtic 
Tiger boom. 
 
The paper begins by arguing that the boom, and now its collapse, have been largely 
analysed through the lens of neo-classical economics and modernisation theory.   3
Therefore much attention is paid to economic issues such as the role of foreign direct 
investment (FDI) and the need for cost competitiveness, or social issues such as 
liberalisation of values and practices, upward social mobility, increased living 
standards and debates about social polarisation. While these lens offer many valuable 
and valid insights, they tend to neglect the particular and distinctive structural 
characteristics of the way the Irish economy and Irish society have developed, and the 
reasons for these.  
 
The approach taken here identifies the ‘Irish model’ that emerged during the boom 
years, a particular form of structured power which both reflects and shapes the power 
structures of the Irish economy, the polity, the society and, indeed, the power of 
dominant ideas. The paper then moves to place this ‘model’ in a wider international 
context that profoundly shapes it, again something that tends not to be sufficiently 
probed by the dominant analytical approaches mentioned above. Particular attention is 
paid to the emergence of financialisation as a driver of a particular kind of global 
economy which we have tended loosely to label ‘globalisation’. Focusing attention on 
the role of the financial sector in structuring and driving this so-called ‘new 
economy’, allows the Irish boom to be more clearly and accurately identified as one 
national development experience that was profoundly shaped by the flows, the power 
and the values of financialisation, though with a particular Irish hue reflecting long-
standing features of Irish society such as the role of property speculation and so-called 
‘developers’. In these ways, the paper intends to map out more fully and analytically 
the contours of what has led Ireland to the deep crisis in which it now finds itself. 
This provides the foundation for interrogating the legacies, for these derive from the 
multiple restructurings that have transformed the Irish economy and society over the   4
past two decades. Drawing on a wide range of social scientific analyses, the paper 
identifies what it regards as the most significant legacies of the Celtic Tiger for 
Ireland’s longer-term development. In the light of these, it concludes by offering a 
reading of possible future scenarios as they can now be identified amid the debates 
and politics of the post-boom crisis. 
 
The ‘Irish model’ 
The ‘Irish model’ has been recognised more abroad than at home. The remarkable 
upgrading of sections of the Irish industrial and service economy, as illustrated for 
example by van Egeraat and Barry (2009), the rise in living standards that places 
Ireland as having one of the highest per capita gross domestic product (GDP) rates in 
the world, the turnaround in employment which saw Ireland move from having one of 
the highest unemployment rates in the EU to one of the lowest, the high and sustained 
growth rates that placed Ireland more on a par with China and East Asian countries 
than with its neighbours, and the emergence of Ireland as a significant destination for 
emigrants from various eastern European and African countries especially, all helped 
draw worldwide attention to the Celtic Tiger. However, beyond the manifestations of 
success, what attracted particular attention was that Ireland seemed to be bucking the 
neo-liberal trend since it was recognised that the state played a key role in the 
achievement of these successes. The Industrial Development Authorities (IDA’s) 
success in winning high levels of foreign investment, particularly in attracting to 
establish in Ireland most of the leading companies in certain high-tech industries such 
as computers, biotechnology, pharmaceuticals and financial services, caused not a 
little envy. Coupled to that was the role of social partnership which was widely seen 
as underpinning a broad consensus approach to policy making that laid solid   5
foundations for the success to continue. As the much referenced Foreign Policy 
magazine globalisation index showed Ireland to be one of the most globalised 
countries in the world (see A.T. Kearney/Foreign Policy, 2007, 2006, 2005, 2004, 
2003, 2002, 2001), Ireland’s success came to be seen as ‘a showcase of globalisation’ 
(Smith, 2005: 2), a model for other latecomers to development in this era of 
globalisation.  
 
The Irish case was therefore widely seen as an alternative to neo-liberalism. As 
influential Economic and Social Research Institute (ESRI) scholars, Nolan, O’Connell 
and Whelan had put it, ‘the Irish growth experience and its distributional 
consequences is not a simple story of globalisation, forced withdrawal of the state and 
the promotion of neo-liberalism’ (2000: 1). Not only did this reading become widely 
accepted overseas but it was also the dominant one at home. However, due to the 
dominance of a neo-classical economic outlook with its focus on large flows of 
investment, exports and profits, and on the modernisation of Irish society, both of 
these ideas actively propagated through the media (Phelan, 2009) too few critical 
questions were asked about what exact role the state was playing and in whose 
interests. It was only with the sudden collapse of the Celtic Tiger that such questions 
began to be asked. As Nobel Economics prizewinner, Paul Krugman put it in a New 
York Times article that greatly annoyed the Irish government, ‘Ireland jumped with 
both feet into the brave new world of unsupervised global markets. … One part of the 
Irish economy that became especially free was the banking sector, which used its 
freedom to finance a monstrous housing bubble. … And the lesson of Ireland is that 
you really, really don’t want to put yourself in a position where you have to punish 
your economy in order to save your banks’ (Krugman, 2009). By late 2009, the   6
unhealthy nexus between senior politicians and state bureaucrats on the one hand and 
property developers and bankers on the other had at last come to be appreciated more 
widely and questions began to be asked about what precise role the state was playing: 
was it restraining and guiding the market in a developmental direction, as had been 
the widespread reading of the Irish model, or instead was it being captured by national 
and global market forces. Fears that state attempts to salvage the Irish banking system 
by setting up a so-called ‘bad bank’, the National Asset Management Agency 
(NAMA), sparked widespread public opposition in 2009 since it was seen as an 
attempt by the state to bail out the property developers and bankers that had landed 
the Irish economy and society in such a mess. 
 
The collapse of the Celtic Tiger shows up the severe limitations of the dominant lens 
through which it was analysed, both by academics and in public discourse. If the 
benign reading that was unassailable through the boom years concentrated on 
economic flows, the more critical reading that quickly emerged with the collapse 
began at last to concentrate on power, not just formal political power but the strength 
of elite vested interests that to a great extent managed to capture that power for their 
own interests. This focus on the structures of power in the Irish political economy is 
necessary if one of the major legacies of the period is to be identified and its lessons 
learnt. Only in this way can the true nature of the Irish model as a power structure be 
uncovered and its economic and social consequences identified. A number of key 
features of this Irish model can be readily identified.  
 
Key features of the Irish model   7
The first and perhaps most important is the highly dependent nature of the productive 
economy. What distinguishes the Irish economy from other so-called developed 
economies is its extreme dependence on multinational capital. Over 25 years after the 
landmark report on Irish industrial strategy, the Telesis report of 1982, recommended 
that the state move away from such heavy reliance on multinational investment, the 
Irish economy finds itself even more dependent for its growth, output and exports on 
such investment. Indeed, Grimes and Collins (2009) show even the state’s belated 
strategy of investing in research and development (R&D) capacity is heavily 
influenced by the needs of multinational capital. As Dan O’Brien of the Economist 
Intellegence Unit has stated: ‘The imperative of attracting and keeping foreign firms 
has soaked deep into every nook and cranny of the apparatus of the state in a way not 
to be observed elsewhere’ (quoted in Collins, 2007: 118). The full significance of this 
dependence is only captured by the approach being followed here, namely through a 
focus on power structures rather than just on economic flows. For what we have at the 
heart of the Irish model is the entrenched power of foreign capital and this limits 
severely the room for manoeuvre of domestic policy makers. Nowhere is this better 
illustrated than by the state’s (and indeed the public’s) acceptance as unquestionable 
that taxes on corporate profits must remain low, even amid the severe fiscal crisis of 
2009 as the Irish state desperately required to raise additional revenue from whatever 
source to try to bridge a burgeoning budget deficit. It is simply outside the pale of 
reasonable political discourse, or ‘common sense’, to ask why ordinary wage earners 
should be asked to carry the burden of hefty new taxes imposed as a crisis response to 
the fiscal crisis of the Celtic Tiger’s collapse even as some of the world’s most 
powerful multinational companies continue to make lavish profits in Ireland, way 
beyond what they can make elsewhere. As Gottheil has written, the profit rates as a   8
percent of sales of US multinational operating in Ireland have been ‘scarcely short of 
awesome’ (Gottheil, 2003: 731). The failure of the Irish state and private sector to 
generate strong export-oriented, high-tech sectors in the domestic economy raises 
major questions about development policy, the culture and capacity of the private 
sector and, indeed, about the goals of the state itself that are far too little asked. Even 
the much vaunted software sector, that seemed in the late 1990s to mark a 
breakthrough in this regard, has proved in hindsight to be a disappointment, with most 
of the successful firms being bought out by multinationals. 
 
The developmental consequences of this heavy dependence are best seen in the 
second key feature of the Irish model, namely its reliance on low-taxes since it is seen 
as a key mechanism to attract foreign investment. Not only is the overall burden of 
taxation low in Ireland but the structure of the tax base was changed during the Celtic 
Tiger boom in such as way as to increase the vulnerability of the state’s finances. The 
overall composition of the tax system was changed over the course of the boom, with 
reductions in taxes on capital gains and a low tax on corporate profits while the state 
relied significantly more than other EU countries on taxes on goods and services 
(Value Added Tax), widely regarded as hitting the poor most severely. As was stated 
by O’Toole and Cahill a little before the Celtic Tiger collapse, the structure of this 
taxation system ‘leaves the Irish economy particularly vulnerable to an economic 
shock’ (O’Toole and Cahill, 2006: 207), which is precisely what happened in 2008-
09. Furthermore, as a tradeoff for wage moderation, income taxes were reduced at the 
height of the boom, further eroding the state’s tax base. Former Taoiseach (prime 
minister), Garret FitzGerald, has written scathingly of these consequences: ‘The idea 
that when the boom ended our public and social services could be maintained with   9
such a minuscule level of income tax payments was patently absurd, although clearly 
many people fell for it – including our economically unsophisticated business 
community’ (FitzGerald, 2008a: 14). This commitment to low taxes is deeply 
entrenched in the psyche not just of state officials and many politicians but also of the 
Irish voter, too used to inefficient public services and the evident waste of public 
monies. It was revealing that among the instructions given to the Commission on 
Taxation when established in early 2008 was that it keep the overall burden of 
taxation low and not increase the tax rate on corporate profits. But the consequences 
of this commitment to a low-tax regime is on the spending side, particularly spending 
on welfare. The Irish welfare state has been described as ‘a pay-related welfare state’ 
the expansion of which ‘was accomplished in such a manner as to leave privilege 
essentially undisturbed’ (O’Connell and Rottman, 1992: 206) as middle class citizens 
benefit from state spending on pensions, education or health care while 
supplementing this through their own private spending. In Boyle’s telling phrase, the 
Irish welfare state ended the Celtic Tiger period as ‘Europe’s most anorexic welfare 
state’ opting always for low-cost and short-term solutions to complex social problems 
(Boyle, 2005: 115). The results of this feature of the model were well summed up by 
FitzGerald: ‘Our chaotic health service and our grossly understaffed education 
system, together with the many serious inadequacies of our social services, reflect 
very badly upon a political system that has massively maldistributed the huge 
resources we have created. The harsh truth is we have allowed far too much of our 
new wealth to be creamed off by a few influential people, at the expense of the public 
services our people are entitled to’ (FitzGerald, 2008b: 16). Therefore, a particularly 
perverse legacy of the Celtic Tiger boom is the failure to improve public services and 
the high levels of relative poverty and inequality that persist.   10
 
Nature of the Irish state 
These features of the model allow a re-examination of the active role played by the 
Irish state. For, far from being a progressive state moulding market forces for 
developmental ends, the activism of the Irish state has been used to make the 
development of Irish society all the more dependent on providing the conditions for 
global corporations to make very large profits in Ireland. This has led some analysts 
to argue that the Irish state is an exemplar of the ‘competition state’ which prioritises 
the needs of global competitiveness over those of the welfare of society (Kirby and 
Murphy, 2008) rather than being, as others have argued, a new form of 
‘developmental network state’ (Ó Riain, 2004). One important example is the culture 
of weak regulation which, in Collins’s words, ‘is rather more informed by economic 
theory than democratic principles or electoral considerations’ (Collins, 2007: 131), 
implementing light-touch regulation that essentially trusted the market to operate for 
the good of society rather than for its own good. The deep crisis of the Irish banking 
system which rashly lent to property developers at the height of the boom is one 
consequence of this ‘regulation-lite’.  
 
A central feature of the Irish model of state has been the role of social partnership as a 
principle of policy making. This has been seen by some analysts as being similar to 
the concertative policy-making of progressive social democratic states; however, 
closer examination casts doubt on this and highlights how social partnership has 
functioned to create a cosy consensus within policy making circles and co-opted 
elements such as the trade unions and community and voluntary sector (NGOs 
working with marginalised and disadvantaged groups) which had the potential to take   11
a more critical stance on the Irish model. Taylor finds that ‘almost perversely, these 
institutionalised forms of intermediation appear to have become a vehicle for 
imposing a neo-liberal political agenda’ (Taylor, 2005: 14), while Roche and Cradden 
conclude that ‘social partnership in Ireland since 1987 can best be understood in terms 
of the theory of competitive corporatism’ (Roche and Cradden, 2003: 87), namely the 
enhancement of national competitiveness and the flexibilisation of the conditions for 
labour. Yet, once given a seat at the policy-making table, trade union and NGO 
representatives found themselves locked into a tight embrace by the state. Most, 
though privately critical of how little the process offered them, saw the balance of 
advantage as lying in staying in rather than getting out as their members benefited 
modestly from the distribution of the largesse of the economic boom. However, as Ó 
Broin has concluded, the cost is that ‘the state has engaged in a process of 
bureaucratising potential vehicles for dissent’ (Ó Broin, 2009: 123), thereby severely 
weakening the bases for any serious challenge to the Irish model or laying the 
foundations for an alternative. 
 
With the sudden collapse of the Celtic Tiger, the model that had seemed so successful 
while the boom lasted was exposed as being a major contributor to the severity of the 
Irish crisis and as posing obstacles to economic and social recovery. The high levels 
of dependence on foreign investment at a time of intense international competition for 
such investment, the weak capacity of the Irish state to develop its own productive 
resources in a more sustainable way and its culture of regulation-lite, the undermining 
of state capacity and social investment caused by the low and vulnerable tax base, the 
co-optation of the trade union and community and voluntary sectors into social 
partnership, all contributed to the failure to restrain the exuberance of the market and   12
to the severely restricted options now faced by the Irish state and society. In 
comparing the Irish and Danish models, Sørensen drew attention to the fact that ‘the 
Danish model has been developed and strengthened by having to cope with several 
major challenges, including two world wars and the economic crisis of the 1930s’ 
whereas ‘the successful Irish model has not faced a real critical challenge so far; it’s 
been all smooth sailing in sunshine and tailwinds’ (Sørensen, 2007: 8). As difficulties 
did emerge in 2008, they immediately exposed these weaknesses of the Irish model, 
most evidently in the severe budget deficit that opened up virtually overnight and that 
has constrained the Irish state from introducing the sort of stimulus measures that 
formed a core part of the recovery plans in other countries. At the time of writing it 
remains to be seen how successful the Irish state will be in rescuing its banking sector 
and in laying the foundations for a more sustainable model of development to emerge; 
what is obvious is that one of the perverse legacies of the Celtic Tiger boom is a 
model that constrains rather than aids recovery. 
 
The Contradictions of Neoliberal Globalisation: Financialisation and Property 
Prices 
As noted above Ireland’s political economy was inserted into the ongoing process of 
globalisation from the 1980s to the 2000s in distinctive ways. However, in order to 
understand the nature, depth and extent of the current crisis of economy and politics 
in Ireland and how they are manifest socially in increasing unemployment and 
deprivation it is also important to understand the constitutive features of neoliberal 
globalisation more generally and how these shaped the evolution of both the Irish 
economic boom and the subsequent dramatic contraction.  
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Amongst the developed countries Ireland’s economic contraction is one of the most 
severe. Estimates vary as to the precise scale of economic contraction during 2009, 
but go as high as double digits. The Economic and Social Research Institute (ESRI) 
estimated Ireland’s economy would contract by around 14 per cent between 2008 and 
2010 which they described as being ‘by historic and international standards … a truly 
dramatic development’ (Barrett et al., 2009: 32). European Commission figures 
showed a decline of 2.3 per cent in Ireland’s GDP in 2008, a forecast decline of 9 per 
cent for 2009 and a further decline of 2.6 per cent in 2010. This put Ireland just 
behind the three Baltic states for the depth of its economic depression over these three 
years but Ireland found itself in the worst position in the EU in terms of its budget 
deficit with the European Commission forecasting in spring 2009 that this would 
reach 15.6 per cent of GDP by 2010 well above those even of the Baltic states 
(European Commission, 2009). The International Monetary Fund (IMF) in mid 2009 
predicted a GDP decline of about 13.5 per cent for Ireland between 2008 and 2010 
and said the Irish crisis ‘matches episodes of the most severe economic distress in 
post-World War II history’ (IMF, 2009: 28). The depth of the Irish collapse therefore 
mirrors the heights of the Irish boom when GNP growth during 1995-2000 averaged 
over 8 per cent per annum.  
 
The speed and severity of the economic contraction is a reflection of the broader 
contradictions of globalisation and how these become spatially embedded. The 
globalised capitalist economy is a technologically dynamic system that has generated 
massive increases in gross world product since the end of the Second World War in 
particular. This is in part an outcome of what economists term Say’s law: supply 
creating its own demand. As new factories and other units of economic production   14
come into being the wages of workers, and profits for capital provide a source of 
demand for the products of other firms and industries. However, this potentially 
virtuous cycle of economic growth is disrupted through the spatially constituted and 
expressed contradiction between the forces and the relations of production. As more 
mobile forms of productive capital seek out cheaper labour – the well known 
phenomenon of off-shoring – they potentially undercut the purchasing power of the 
global working class and create an underconsumptionist dynamic in the global 
economy. As most workers in China, now the ‘workshop of the world’, cannot afford 
to buy many of the products they produce, primarily for export, demand patterns are 
unstable. In most foreign owned factories in the Pearl River Delta in 2004 the 
minimum was US $54 a month in 2004, and companies often deducted the costs of 
food and accommodation from this (Breslin, 2009). Lack of domestic demand is also 
exacerbated by the policies of the Chinese Communist Party in forcing very high 
levels of savings over 40 per cent of GDP. If the expansion of productive capacity is 
limited by the constraints of global market size, this presents a problem as to where 
the newly created capital can be profitably invested. This in turn has led to capital 
moving into globalised financial circuits in search of valorisation, or profitability
2.  
 
David Harvey (2003) has described this phenomenon as one of over-accumulation: 
that is an excess of capital relative to the productive outlets in which it might be 
invested. Consequently there is a need to seek out other avenues of valorisation, or 
ways of increasing the value of investments, through currency speculation and other 
forms of financial engineering. Over-accumulation also manifests itself through asset 
price appreciations or bubbles as excess capital flows into stock and property markets. 
                                                 
2 The other partial ‘solution’ has, until recently, been debt-fuelled consumption in the rich world, particularly the 
United States. 
   15
This inflow of capital pushes prices higher encouraging further investment and 
‘artificially’ inflating prices. However, these ultimately become unsustainable and just 
as all investors want to be in on a rising market, they rush for the exits once asset 
values start to substantially decline (see Taylor, 1988 for a discussion).  
 
According to Kallis et al.  (2009: 15) ‘at the roots of the crisis is the growing 
disjuncture between the real economy of production and the paper economy of 
finance’. However, the financial circuits of globalised capital accumulation are only 
partially autonomised from the real economy, as the production of exchange value is 
still ultimately dependent on work being undertaken to produce use values. Money is 
a claim on the production of goods and services produced in a country or currency 
area and therefore linked to expectations about productivity growth for example 
(Cohen, 2000). This link between finance and production cannot be fully broken 
despite the creation of additional fictitious commodities (Polanyi, 1944), such as 
mortgage-backed securities, which were the initial vehicle for the crisis to break in the 
United States. Speculation does not create use value, it merely reallocates gains and 
losses through the redistribution of social surplus.  
 
This is the broader economic context in which the global property boom of late 1990s 
and early 2000s materialised. Capital which could not be invested in expanded 
productive capacity given the limitations on market size and demand found outlets in 
other areas, particularly stock market and property price appreciations. From 1997-
2004 housing prices in Ireland increased on the order of 160 per cent: an astonishing 
increase, although outstripped by South Africa where they increased 200 per cent 
(Bond 2006). According to the Economist the world housing boom represented the   16
‘biggest bubble in history’ (cited in Bond, 2006) and Ireland participated in the 
inflation of this bubble at a disproportionate rate. At the height of the boom Irish 
house prices were rising at a unbelievable 30 per cent a year.  
 
It was thought that that the ‘new’ global economy based on high technology and 
financial trading could defy the laws of economics and avoid a hard landing. US 
house prices had not gone down since the Great Depression and perhaps the Irish 
economy could replicate this experience? The well-known macro-economist Robert 
Gordon referred to the ‘goldilocks economy’ in the US which was not too hot or too 
cold (Gordon, 2004), but it was forgotten that Goldilocks was a fairytale.  
 
The Irish Policy Regime and Property Prices 
The precise contours of the housing bubble were also shaped by the domestic Irish 
policy regime. As is well known Ireland’s erstwhile economic success up until the 
2000s was built on the attraction of inward foreign direct investment, particularly of 
US-based transnational corporations in the high-tech and pharmaceutical sectors. 
Ireland received inflows of foreign direct investment of US$140 billion from 1995-
2004 (Finfacts Team, 2005). This was only slightly less than Mexico with a 
population roughly thirty times larger. Unbelievably in 2003 Ireland attracted almost 
the same level of inward foreign direct investment as the United States. The 
sustainability of these flows should always have been open to question, given their 
scale and their likely macro-economic impacts. According to the United Nations 
Conference on Trade and Development the stock of foreign investment in Ireland 
peaked in 2003, and subsequently went into decline (UNCTAD, 2008).  
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As economic convergence was achieved with mainland Europe, some of the cost 
advantages which attracted these companies to establish were eroded, though not 
totally supplanted, as evidenced by continuing high rates of profit, depending on 
sector. Also the nature and geography of input linkages is important in determining 
the level of embeddedness (see Brennan and Breathnach, 2009). However, new 
sources of growth had to be found to underwrite the domestic social compact whereby 
most social groups experienced rising incomes at the cost of dramatic increases in 
inequality. The formula of tax cuts in exchange for wage restraint had run its course 
as the growth dynamic became introverted, however. This was a central economic, 
social and spatio-temporal contradiction of the Celtic Tiger economy. As Van Egeraat 
and Barry note (2009) dependence on foreign investment means that a large portion of 
the value created in the economy is not captured in Ireland.  
 
As Ireland’s cost-base increased and the shift towards domestic driven growth was 
encouraged by reckless tax cuts, Ireland’s external position suffered. Ireland’s trade 
surplus fell from €38 billion to €26 billion from 2002 to 2006 and 2007 (CSO, 2009). 
However multinational companies continued to extract profits at an increasing rate, 
with net factor income on the current account showing a deficit of €27 billion in 2007 
versus €23 billion in 2002 (CSO, 2009). This gave Ireland the 171
st worst 
performance on the current account out of 190 countries in the CIA World Factbook 
(CIA, 2009); the worst being the United States which also experienced its own debt-
fuelled housing boom. The resulting gap had to be plugged by inflows of capital 
(loans) on the capital account of the balance of payments. The consumption and 
property booms were thus two sides of the private sector debt-fuelled expansion of the 
economy from 2002. However, these were inherently unsustainable as the productive   18
basis of the economy was undermined by rising cost levels, including the affordability 
crisis in the housing sector.  
 
The Irish boom was sustained beyond its ‘natural’ life span of catch-up growth by 
imports of capital and labour, particularly from Eastern Europe. However this growth 
was not autocentric in the sense of there being a sustainable propulsive dynamic in the 
domestic economy. Rather it was still characterised by dependence (O'Hearn, 2001), 
but, in this phase of the growth cycle, not so much on productive inward investment, 
but on inflows of financial capital, much of it from Germany (McWilliams, 2006), 
which inflated the domestic property bubble, with attendant over-reliance on taxes 




While taxes from property revenue buoyed the public finances in the 2000s, the 
contradiction between the low-tax model and the need for sustainable sources of 
revenue to finance government expenditure was hidden, but would become 
dramatically evident once the current recession hit. While domestic policy mistakes 
undoubtedly contributed to the housing bubble in Ireland, another way to look at it is 
that it was the outcome of the particular foreign direct investment-dependent model 
pursued by successive Irish governments. The very success of this model in attracting 
foreign investment laid the basis for particularly severe economic contraction as it 
generated asset price appreciations that were unsustainable, particularly in the context 
of the global financial crisis.  
                                                 
3 Laffer is credited with beginning the so-called supply side revolution in economics by drawing a 
graph on a napkin in a restaurant purporting to show that by cutting taxes and thereby reducing the 
‘dead weight’ cost to the economy, the overall tax-take could be increased as economic growth yielded 
higher tax revenues.    19
 
Tiger’s Claw: Social Inequality as a  Constitutive Feature of Neoliberal Globalisation 
As discussed then cycles of boom and bust are constitutive features of a globalised 
capitalist economy and the largely unregulated neoliberal economy exacerbates this 
tendency by allowing capital to flow unrestricted across borders in response to short-
term demand patterns rather than underlying economic ‘fundamentals’, such as debt 
sustainability ratios.  
 
As noted earlier off-shoring and ‘free’ trade put pressure on the wages of unskilled 
workers in the developed world, in tradable sectors in particular. The stagnation of 
wages in the United States over the last three decades has changed consumption 
patterns and given rise to growth of discount retailers such as Wal-Mart, which has 
annual sales in excess of the size of the entire economy of Sub-Saharan Africa 
(Stiglitz, 2006). However, as roughly three quarters of economic activity in the United 
States is based on internal consumption, interest rates cuts and associated house price 
increases served to enable continued mass consumption. As house prices appreciated, 
consumers could remortgage their houses to release (fictitious) equity to further fuel 
the consumption boom. As the Nobel Laureate Joseph Stiglitz (2009: 7) asks: ‘Why 
did Greenspan [the Chairman of the US Federal Reserve] create a bubble? … In the 
absence of lax monetary policy, there would have been insufficient aggregate demand 
in the United States and in the world.’  
 
In the Irish case the entry of Ireland into the European Economic and Monetary Union 
locked in low interest rates more suited to relatively depressed economic conditions in 
Europe’s largest economy Germany, but were pro-cyclical in a booming Irish context,   20
adding further fuel to the flames. These macroeconomic conditions served 
temporarily to disguise the deep-seated problems of growing inequality and 
associated and co-constituted over-accumulation.  
 
The mobility of capital and highly-skilled labour under conditions of economic 
globalisation increase the structural power of capital to influence domestic policy 
regimes (Gill, 2003) and further add to the combined and uneven growth dynamic of 
the global capitalist economy. Booming centres of capital accumulation attract 
inflows of both capital and labour, to the detriment of other parts of the global 
economy. The phenomenon of Indian software programmers working in Silicon 
Valley is well known, but a site visit to Intel’s plant in Leixslip, Co. Kildare reveals 
the same cosmopolitan mix of high-skilled workers from around the world.  
 
As Saskia Sassen (2001) has shown, the defining sectors of the global informational 
economy – financial services and high-tech industry – create both high and low-
skilled jobs such as janitors and canteen workers. In the initial phases of the Celtic 
Tiger, Ireland’s economic growth was based on these two most globalised sectors. 
One of the poster-children for the Celtic Tiger growth model was the International 
Financial Services Centre based in Dublin’s docklands, where financial capital only 
paid corporation tax of 10 per cent up until 2003 (MacSharry and White, 2000). These 
companies were avoiding paying higher tax in their home countries and taking 
advantage of Ireland’s favourable tax regime, meaning Ireland constituted in some 
ways an off-shore tax haven, even if it did not conform to the international definition 
of what constitutes a tax haven. The distributive implications of this tax policy need to 
be noted, although in the Irish case the domestic consequences of this were not as   21
severe since many capital owners were overseas shareholders. However, growing 
inequality at both national and international levels was a constitutive feature of this 
highly mobile economy. Its very favourable conditions for capital, therefore, made of 
Ireland a ‘courtesan state’ (Mittleman, 2000) with high levels of inequality an 
essential element of the Irish growth experience.  
 
Esping-Anderson (1999) in his seminal work on welfare regimes includes Ireland in 
the minimalist or residual Anglo-Saxon category, where welfare and social service 
provision is not a universal public good, but targeted at the socially excluded. This is 
certainly the approach that has been pursued in line with the ‘low-tax, enterprise- 
economy’ approach that has been pursued by successive governments since the mid-
1980s. This achieved remarkable success in terms of the reduction of unemployment 
and ‘economic inclusion’ but at the cost of social inclusion, as partly expressed 
through the property boom. Social inclusion and exclusion are dialectically related. 
Greater social inclusion, however defined, may generate deeper exclusion for some 
groups who remain marginalised as their experience deviates further from societal 
norms. For example, those who are illiterate are more deeply marginalised when the 
literacy rate is 90 per cent rather than 50 per cent. The Celtic Tiger was also 
associated with new forms of exclusion in Irish society (see both Howley and Conlon, 
2009).  
 
Ireland’s Structural Position Under Globalisation 
As stated above Ireland’s role as a poster-child of neoliberal globalisation was based 
on its rapid economic growth based on attracting inwards flows of capital and then 
labour once full or near full employment had been reached. However, such were the   22
scale of inflows that the domestic economy’s overheating was even more severe than 
the global overheating and the subsequent meltdown has been worse. The previous 
dot.com bust of 2001 had also led to a shakeout in the indigenous Irish software 
industry in particular and encouraged a reliance on speculative economic activity to 
fuel economic growth. While it is now widely acknowledged that domestic political 
decisions helped fuel this speculative bubble with disastrous consequences for the 
banking system and for Irish society more widely, what is little acknowledged is that 
this speculative activity was intimately connected to the dynamics of global flows and 
the structural nature of the global economy into which Ireland so enthusiastically 
integrated itself. Neither the scale of Ireland’s boom nor the depth of its collapse 
would have been possible in an earlier era, as both were based on inherent features of 
neo-liberal globalisation – vast amounts of capital sloshing around the world with few 
controls or conditions attached, and speculative activity emerging through which this 
capital appeared to be able to grow itself without limits. The inevitable crash has been 
all the more painful for those countries that were seduced by its seemingly painless 
road to riches, if not quite to a balanced social development.  
 
The other side of this coin of seemingly painless growth is the fuelling of inequality. 
It is little surprise that Ireland displays one of the highest levels of income inequality 
in the developed world (Smeeding and Nolan, 2004) which the gap between its levels 
of income and its levels of social development also distinguish it. According to the 
United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) Ireland had the fourth highest per 
capita income in the world, yet it ranks 26
th in life expectancy, bringing up the bottom 
of the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development rankings (United 
Nations Development Programme, 2008). Because of its exceptionally high per capita   23
income, Ireland had gained ground on the composite Human Development Index, in 
which it had previously underperformed. However, with relatively poor life 
expectancy and cutbacks in educational and health care provision associated with the 
recession, Ireland’s position is likely to fall considerably on this index. It may be that 
the recession will have a positive effect on income inequality as it reduces the wealth 
of the capital holders, yet the gaps between economic and social development will 
remain a marked feature of the Irish case. 
 
Ireland’s economic success was built on the sharing of sovereignty and the blurring of 
the distinction between the internal and external. The Single European Act meant that 
Ireland’s ‘internal’ market was the EU, whereas it still retained the ability to set its 
own, low, corporation tax to attract inward investment (see Carmody 2003 for a fuller 
discussion). Ireland then occupies an anomalous space in the global political 
economy: displaying both highly developed forces of production and an acute on-
going dependence on inflows of foreign capital. This has resulted in a structural gap 
between an economy with high-tech dynamic features and a society that benefits far 
too little from this through low levels of social investment to help counteract the deep 
inequalities that the particular mode of insertion into the global economy has 
generated. Kirby (2002) called this ‘economic success with social failure’. 
Furthermore, the foundations of the economic model itself were built on shifting sand 
as the country’s very success in attracting these inflows laid the basis for the 
subsequent scale of the economic bust which was to follow, both reflecting the global 
financial and economic crisis, but also Ireland’s very dependent position within the 
global order. 
   24
Legacies and future scenarios 
As outlined above, the economic collapse in 2008-09 has allowed a fuller appreciation 
of the ambiguities of today’s neoliberal and speculative globalisation and how Ireland 
has integrated itself in a very naïve and dependent way into the intense flows of 
capital, exports and, to a lesser extent labour, that it generated. The principal legacy, 
largely unthinkable as recently as late 2007, are a collapse in property prices that has 
dragged down the whole banking system forcing the state to put it on a life-support 
system. Paradoxically, as evidenced by continuing buoyant exports from key sectors 
of the economy dominated by multinational companies, particularly the 
pharmaceutical sector, the Irish crisis is much more home grown than is the case 
among most other industrialised countries. While this has been recognised by Irish 
economists, what is less recognised are the structural features that this reveals. For 
essentially it shows a disconnect between the engines of ‘growth’ of the economy, 
essentially in the hands of multinationals which continue to make good profits in 
Ireland even as the national economy enters into severe crisis. Therefore, the 
structural dualism between the booming foreign-owned sectors of the Irish economy 
and the much weaker domestically owned sectors has been deepened over the course 
of the Celtic Tiger boom, with the fate of the Irish economy more than ever in the 
hands of the foreign-owned sector. This is one key structural legacy of the boom 
years, which further constrains the room for manoeuvre of policy makers as they seek 
to lay the foundations for economic recovery. 
 
Perhaps the principal constraint imposed by this (path) dependence has already been 
alluded to in the commitment of political and business leaders to Ireland’s low-tax 
model. Not only is this undermining the capacity of the Irish state to undertake the 
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levels of economic and social investment that could help generate a sustainable 
recovery, but it means that the many social deficits accumulated over the course of the 
boom, and exacerbated by the economic collapse, will be left fester with minimal 
attention from the state. It is to be expected therefore that the already creaking health 
and education systems as well as the many inadequate social services, particularly for 
the most needy and vulnerable, will grow worse over the coming years with 
inestimable consequences for the health and cohesion of Irish society. A second 
legacy of the boom therefore is that Ireland’s ability to move into a more high-tax 
road to development is even more limited than before due to the extreme dependence 
on multinational companies. Perhaps more than anything else, it is this severe 
limitation on the state’s ability to fund a stimulus package that marks out the Irish 
response from that of most other countries. Yet, little attention is being focused on the 
likelihood that, as the former chief economist of the Central Bank of Ireland, Michael 
Casey, put it, opting so far not to implement a stimulus package, ‘could prove to be 
the worst own goal in our history. … If economic activity falls further, so will 
revenue, and the Government will find itself chasing a target from which it is 
constantly moving away’ (Casey, 2009: 10). In other words, the Irish state finds itself 
caught in a vicious circle which could exacerbate its problems rather then help resolve 
them.  
 
The analysis in the previous section of the nature of financialisation in the structural 
conditions of neo-liberal globalisation draws attention to a third legacy of the Irish 
boom that has been missed by most analysts. For, effectively, what allowed the Irish 
model to continue and what hid its inherent contradictions was the ability of the state 
to generate tax income from essentially speculative activity in the housing sector. In   26
other words, it was the property bubble that allowed the low-tax model continue, not 
only generating income for the state but also fuelling the consumer boom that was the 
other motor of economic growth over recent years through employment and wage 
growth in the construction sector in particular. This legacy relates to the wider context 
which allowed the Irish model continue but which has now fundamentally changed 
because its foundations have collapsed. So not only does the Irish political economy 
find itself locked into a situation of extreme dependence and weakened capacity, but 
it is now inserted in a fast changing global context that is far less benign than the one 
in which the Irish boom took place. For neoliberal globalisation was both a class and 
a (trans)national project. It reflected the structural power of transnational capital, in 
particular US capital. Ireland was able to position itself economically as a bridge 
between the US and Europe, as a gateway for US transnational corporations to access 
the European market while also availing of low tax rates and the benefits of EU 
infrastructural expenditure. Ireland was after all the largest recipient of foreign (EU) 
aid in the world in the 1980s (Hanlon, 1996). Yet, not only is this lucky conjuncture 
of elements not going to come together again, but the very structural nature of the 
global economy that it rested on is fundamentally changing, posing major new 
challenges for Ireland. 
 
Conclusion: Power transitions and prospects 
The precise shape of the international policy regimes that will emerge from the global 
economic slowdown is as yet uncertain. However, the global financial crisis is both a 
conjunctural and structural event marking fundamental power transitions. During the 
Celtic Tiger era Ireland hitched its star to the global hegemon, the United States. The 
growth episode from the 1990s was then the result of the particular alignment of   27
globalisation (US transnational investment) and regionalisation (the creation of the 
single European market). However the nature of globalisation is being altered by both 
structure (the rise of China) and conjuncture (the global financial crisis). These two 
are also interrelated. Indeed one way to look at the global financial crisis is as 
marking a fundamental shift of the power of the global political economy to the East. 
The imbalances between the US and China played into crisis formation, as the 
Chinese government gave loans to finance the massive US current account deficit 
(Dumas and Choyleva, 2006). The shift of productive capacity to China would appear 
to be a world historic event exercising ever greater influence over the economic 
prospects of distant parts of the world such as Africa and Latin America (see Paus, 
2009). How will Ireland be affected by these power shifts? Will transnational capital 
be subject to increased regulation at source, through the taxing of off-shore profits, as 
has been suggested in the US for example? These questions indicate the hugely 
uncertain context in which Ireland now finds itself. 
 
In the light of these principal legacies of the Celtic Tiger boom, we can now ask how 
Ireland can move beyond them. Here again we find the state in a most restricted 
position, largely due to the depth and extent of the crisis in which the Irish banks find 
themselves. Having already guaranteed all bank deposits, a gesture far more generous 
than anything offered by other states, the establishment of the National Asset 
Management Agency (NAMA) and the government’s commitment to pay above 
current (late 2009) market prices for the bad loans held by the banking system, has 
committed the state to a most risky endeavour which could, in the eyes of experts, 
leave it with massive liabilities for many years to come. Already locked into a low-tax 
model and in a situation of severe economic uncertainty, the state finds itself with few   28
options other than to take on immense financial commitments. Therefore, the attempt 
to maintain the present model of heavy dependence of US investment and of a low-
tax fiscal system while assuming immense liabilities in order to save the banking 
system is fraught with huge uncertainties. While there exist no options that offer any 
greater certainty, the structural legacies outlined here would seem to indicate that a 
greater attempt must be made to break with them, best summed up in the proposal for 
the founding of a ‘second republic’. As articulated by O’Sullivan (himself a banker), 
this would involve a fundamental reform of the institutions of the political system and 
of the state, seeking to develop a capacity for strategic thinking and leadership that 
has been conspicuously lacking. As he wrote, ‘the way we think about the economic, 
social and political issues facing Ireland in a post-credit crisis world needs to be 
revolutionary rather than the tame fumbling we are used to’ (O’Sullivan, 2009: 10). 
Inherent in this proposal, though not alluded to by O’Sullivan, is the need for a new 
class alignment in Irish society, marginalising from power the narrow nexus of 
politicians, speculators and ‘developers’ and developing a broader alliance of 
entrepreneurial and progressive political and business interests, backed by a wider 
social mobilisation pressing for a rebalancing of the subservient nature of the state’s 
relationship to the market. This is a way of breaking out of the far too restricting 
structural legacies of a model that has run its course and is now in severe crisis.  
  
Ireland is both a mirror and prism for neoliberal globalisation. It is a mirror in the 
sense that the growing inequality which has been a feature of neoliberal globalisation 
has been reflected in the evolution of the Irish social structure during the era of the 
Celtic Tiger. But it also offers us a prism through which to view the fundamental 
power shifts that have taken place in the global political economy over the last several   29
decades and the way in which power is being reconfigured in the current crisis. This 
is the approach adopted in this paper. The key question facing Ireland therefore can be 
posed as follows: Is Ireland trapped by a dying neo-liberalism or has it the capacity to 
find a way beyond it? Will Europe move towards regulation of capital through tax 
coordination for example? It is going to be very interesting over the coming years to 
observe how an answer to this question will be fashioned out of the clash of different 
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